What is the right level of spending needed for health and care in the UK? by Charlesworth, Anita et al.
1 
 
What is the right level of spending needed for health and care in the UK? 
Anita Charlesworth, Michael Anderson,* Cam Donaldson, Paul Johnson, Martin Knapp, Ali McGuire, 
Martin McKee, Elias Mossialos, Peter Smith, Andrew Street, Michael Woods 
*With the exception of the Lead Author, the remaining co-authors are listed alphabetically as they 
provided equal contributions to this paper 
 
Abstract 
The health and care sector plays a valuable role in improving population health and societal 
wellbeing, protecting people from the financial consequences of illness, reducing health and income 
inequalities, and supporting economic growth. However, there is much debate regarding what is the 
appropriate level of funding in the UK. In this paper we look at the economic impact of the COVID-19 
pandemic, historical spending in the UK and comparable countries, assess the role of private 
spending, and review spending projections to estimate future needs. Public spending on health has 
increased by 3·7% a year, on average, since the NHS was founded in 1948, and has assumed a larger 
share of both the economy and government expenditure. Over the last decade, except during the 
pandemic, the rate of growth of government spending for the health and care sector has slowed.  
We argue that without average growth in public spending on health of at least 4% per year, in real-
terms, there is a real risk of degradation of the NHS, reductions in coverage of benefits, increased 
inequalities and increased reliance on private financing. COVID-19 has highlighted major issues in 
the capacity and resilience of the health and care system.  We recommend an independent review 
to examine what additional funds are required to better equip the UK to withstand further acute 
shocks and major threats to health. A similar, if not higher, level of growth in public spending on 
social care is needed in order to provide high standards of care and decent terms and conditions for 
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social care staff, alongside an immediate uplift in public spending to implement long-overdue 
reforms recommended by the Dilnot Commission to improve financial protection.  
 
Introduction 
Since the National Health Service (NHS) was founded in 1948, public spending on health has more 
than doubled from 3·5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) to 7·2 percent in 2018-19.1,2 In real 
terms, spending is over ten times the amount it was seventy years ago.1 Despite the scale of the 
growth in health and care spending, there have been repeated ‘crises’ as funding increases have not 
kept pace with rising demand, expectations or technological needs.3  
In recent years, measures to cope with the gap between demand and funding in the UK have 
involved measures such as raiding capital expenditure to boost revenue spending and restricting 
growth in staff pay alongside announcements to increase public funding such as the 2018 pledge to 
increase funding for the NHS in England by £20·5 billion in real terms per year by 2023-24,4 and the 
2019 pledge to increase capital investment in the NHS in England by £1·8 billion.5  
We argue that instead of short-term and reactive funding measures, a longer-term solution for both 
NHS and social care funding is necessary for a sustainable health and care service, which we define 
as a service which provides as a minimum, similar levels of quality and access as currently enjoyed, 
taking into account future trends in demography, morbidity and technology. Increased investment is 
also needed to improve the preparedness and resilience of the health and care system to withstand 
further acute shocks and major threats to health. Survey data indicates that, if funding for the NHS 
were to increase, the majority of the public would support tax increases.6 Public views on who 
should pay for social care are more nuanced, but more than half believe the government should pay, 




However, there needs to be increased clarity about the level of funding necessary for a sustainable 
health and care service. This paper attempts to provide further clarity, while also being conscious of 
the significant economic uncertainty created by the COVID-19 pandemic. Consequently, we begin 
with a discussion of the state of the economy and potential economic impact of the recent COVID-19 
pandemic. We then discuss the following policy questions, linked to the fiscal sustainability 
challenges identified by the Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR),8 and Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD):9  
1. What is the contribution of the health and care sector to wider society?  
2. How does health spending in the UK compare to other countries? 
3. How has health and care spending changed over time? 
4. How does health and care spending vary across the UK? 
5. What is the role of private spending on health in the UK?   
6. What level of spending is needed for a sustainable health and care service? 
Panel 1: Key Messages 
• According to estimates by the OBR, OECD, and IFS, we can expect GDP to reduce between 
9.5% and 14.3% in 2020, whilst future growth is highly uncertain and dependent upon the 
any further waves of COVID-19 infections and access to an effective vaccine. 
• Achieving increased health spending against this economic backdrop requires a 
combination of increased government borrowing in the short-term and taxation in the 
medium to long-term. 
• There is a strong economic rationale to invest in the health and care sector, to improve 
health, societal wellbeing, and reduce health and income inequalities. 
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• In common with countries across the OECD, health spending in the UK has grown faster 
than the overall economy. However, growth in health and care spending has been highly 
volatile, with periods of relative plenty followed by periods of relative austerity.   
• Spending volatility is not conducive to long-term planning and efficiency; to secure the 
long-term future of the NHS, there is a need for increased consensus regarding the right 
level of spending for health and care in the UK.  
• While responsibility for health and care delivery is devolved, spending decisions in 
England impact Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland through proportional allocations set 
by the Barnett formula. 
• Private spending on health plays a limited role in the UK, and a major strength of the NHS 
is in providing protection against the financial consequences of ill-health. 
• For the NHS, to meet cost and demand pressures over the next 15 years, spending needs 
to grow by at least 3.3% per year, on average, in real terms. However, to improve the 
quality of services, reduce waiting times, increase staffing numbers and invest in capital, 
spending will need to grow by at least 4% year, on average, in real terms. 
• For social care, to meet cost and demand pressures over the next 15 years spending 
needs to grow at 3.9% per year, on average, in real terms. Improving financial protection 
by introducing a £100,000 means tested threshold and £75,000 maximum contribution in 
England, would require even more in social care spending. 
• In the short-term, a further uplift in public spending is needed to address growing unmet 
need for healthcare services caused by postponing or cancelling elective procedures and 
diagnostic tests during the pandemic.   
• We also recommend an independent review to examine what additional funds are 
required to improve the preparedness and resilience of the health and care system to 





The economy and the COVID-19 pandemic  
The social distancing measures implemented in response to the pandemic were necessary to slow 
the spread of coronavirus and limit excess mortality, but they have also closed down business 
activity in many sectors and had a dramatic impact on the UK’s economic output. Estimates - 
although uncertain - by the OBR, 10  OECD, 11  and Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS),12 expect GDP in 
the UK to reduce between 9.5% and 14.3% in 2020. Future growth is highly dependent upon any 
further waves of infections and access to an effective vaccine, however these projections generally 
expect GDP to recover to pre pandemic levels by 2022. Future economic growth is also uncertain 
due to the UK leaving the European Union (EU). Most projections indicate that growth of the UK 
economy will be smaller leaving the EU than it would have been with continuing membership of the 
EU.13 
Combined with the impact of a weaker economy, the OBR’s central scenario expects government 
borrowing to reach just under £400 billion in 2020.10   This would be the highest deficit since the 
Second World War. However, there is consensus among economists that immediate reductions in 
public spending or acute rises in taxation would make the long-term situation worse.14,15 Increased 
public spending is needed to support individuals and businesses through, for example, furloughing, 
grants and loans, and to mitigate against potential long-term impacts on the economy from 
otherwise viable businesses failing, and high and sustained unemployment. Moreover, the period of 
austerity preceding the pandemic left the health and care system under-resourced and vulnerable to 
an acute shock and major threats to health. This ultimately exacerbated the economic impact of the 
pandemic itself, and has reinforced the economic case for developing a resilient health and care 
system. This will require the UK government to commit to sustained increases in health and care 
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spending, as well as placing improving health and societal wellbeing at the heart of policy making. 
Whilst we acknowledge it will be challenging to achieve this in the current economic climate, we 
argue this could be achieved through a combination of increased government borrowing in the 
short-term and taxation in the medium to longer term.   
What is the contribution of the health and care sector to wider society?  
The health and care sector is valuable: it improves the health and wellbeing of the population, 
reduces inequalities and improves societal welfare. The sector also improves productivity and output 
through the associated increases in population health, which is especially important as the pension 
age is increasing. Furthermore, it is a large part of the economy, with 4·5 million jobs (approximately 
one in eight jobs in the UK, and nearly one in six jobs in Wales) in the health and social care sector in 
2018.16  
 
Health spending and health outcomes 
The contribution that health spending makes toward improving health outcomes has been difficult 
to establish because outcomes are influenced by a range of environmental, social and economic 
factors beyond the health and care system. Moreover, analysis of historic trends is not necessarily a 
predictor of future trends. Nevertheless, there are some studies that attempt to quantify the link 
between health system spending and health outcomes.17 Research using the concept of amenable 
mortality,18 now incorporated in the Health Access and Quality Index, has shown that effective and 
timely healthcare makes a substantial contribution to population health.19 Several analyses of NHS 
programme budgeting data show a clear link between increased health spending and improved 
health outcomes in the NHS, with the cost of securing an extra quality-adjusted life year (QALY) 
ranging between £5,000 and £15,000.20–22 At the macro level, an analysis of OECD countries 
concluded that increased health and care expenditure was associated with better health 
outcomes.23 The return on expenditure varies across countries, being lowest in the US, partly 
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because high prices mean that expenditure ‘buys’ a lower volume of healthcare.24,25 Recent research 
by the OECD found that, across 35 member countries between 1995 and 2015, a 10% increase in 
health spending was associated with a life expectancy gain of 3·5 months,26 although no measures of 
uncertainty were included in this analysis. Some of these macro-level analyses overlook how the 
impact of health spending on health outcomes is also dependent on how resources are allocated 
throughout the system. For example, investments in prevention may increase life expectancy more 
than investments in end-of-life care, or investments in front-line services may improve health 
outcomes more than investments in high-cost drugs or medical devices. Therefore, as health 
systems continue to manage resources in a climate of resource scarcity, optimising allocative 
efficiency will be an essential strategy to maximise the health gains from health spending.  
 
Health outcomes and economic growth 
There is growing literature focusing on the effect of improving health outcomes on macroeconomic 
growth and the mechanisms through which this occurs; although this is a challenging area to find 
causal evidence. Nevertheless, better health has been shown to increase labour market participation 
and worker productivity, which can increase economic growth.27 There is also evidence that 
increased life expectancy increases incentives to invest in education,28,29 which in turn can improve 
productivity. Poor health during childhood has also been shown to be a predictor of worsened 
health in later life.30,31 Therefore, as improved health can increase overall labour force participation, 
especially near and post retirement age,32,33 childhood health can have long-lasting effects on labour 
force participation and economic growth. Furthermore, illness and disability increase the likelihood 
of being unemployed in the UK,34 and being unwell at work (so-called presenteeism) is responsible 
for significant cost to the UK economy.35 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has also found 
evidence that providing greater access to health services can reduce the decline in total factor 
productivity and thus economic growth from an ageing workforce.36 The COVID-19 pandemic has 
also demonstrated the extreme effect that a health crisis can have on the economy.  
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Health spending, societal welfare and inequality 
Beyond the potential benefits for macroeconomic growth, well directed health and care expenditure 
improves overall societal welfare. For example, improved health in old age can reduce isolation, and 
facilitate greater participation in society. The reverse is also true: care expenditure to reduce social 
isolation has health benefits.37,38 People also derive utility from the knowledge that other people can 
access healthcare: a so-called ‘caring externality’.39 A key founding motivation for the NHS was that 
the sick deserve care, irrespective of their financial circumstances or contributions to the economy.40 
While the NHS has been largely successful in providing care based on clinical need and not on ability 
to pay, there remain significant inequalities in health outcomes. There is estimated to be a 7·4 year 
difference in life expectancy and an 18·9 year difference in healthy life expectancy between the 
highest and lowest deprivation deciles (Supplementary Material Figure 1). While the UK has 
experienced significant increases in life expectancy, rates of increase have slowed markedly since 
2010 and, at some ages, reversed,41 an issue discussed further within the LSE-Lancet Commission 
paper on changing health needs.42  However, it is important to emphasise the restricted influence of 
the health and care sector on health and wellbeing inequalities, which are strongly driven by a range 
of social determinants.43,44 Nevertheless, it has been argued that the NHS often ‘picks up the pieces’ 
when other parts of the social safety net fail.45 
The NHS is funded through general taxation, which is generally progressive. Resources are also 
distributed using a needs-based resource allocation formula, which reflects deprivation.46 Broadly, 
the rich subsidise the poor and the employed subsidise the unemployed; and due to the positive 
association between health and income, the more-healthy subsidise the less-healthy,47 further 
reducing inequality. 48,49 The redistributive effect also depends on the utilisation of healthcare. 
Evidence from the NHS in England,50 estimates the lifetime hospital costs as substantially higher in 




How does health spending in the UK compare to other countries?  
As displayed in Figure 1, the UK spent 10·3% of GDP on health (including both public and private 
spending) in 2019, similar to the average of the EU15 (9·4% of GDP). The highest spending countries 
in the EU are Germany (11·7%), France (11·2%), and Sweden (10·9%). The UK spent less than the 
average of the G7 (11·5%), which includes the US (17·0%). In 2018, 78% of health spending in the UK 
was from public funds – similar to the share in the EU15 (77%), but slightly above that in the G7 
(73%). Public spending includes government spending or compulsory health insurance, whereas 
private spending includes any voluntary health insurance (VHI) or out of pocket payments.51 The 
OECD definition of health spending includes aspects of long-term care which conventionally are 
understood as social care spending in the UK context.51  
 





Note: *Public-private split data for the US reflects 2013. Whilst there is more recent data available older data is 
used to provide comparable split with data from other countries. 
Whilst total spending on health as a proportion of GDP in the UK is above the EU15 average (10.3% 
compared to 9.4% respectively), it is around 6% lower than the EU15 average in $US/person terms, 
$3,620 compared to $3,837 (Figure 1). With regards to the level of capital and workforce, the UK 
generally has less. For example, the UK has a relatively low number of hospital beds, diagnostics and 
clinical staff such as nurses and physicians (Supplementary Material Figure 2). Possible explanations 
for the low number of resources but similar spend could be differences in input prices such as 
physician wages,24 differences in skill-mix such as greater reliance on non-clinical staff,53 or an 
ongoing shift towards moving care delivery from hospitals to the community. 
International comparisons of health spending, capital, and workforce should be interpreted with 
caution. Data may not be comparable and contextual factors contribute to variations. For example, 
low numbers of hospital beds could reflect either a lack of capital investment or successful efforts to 
move care away from the hospital to community settings. Similarly, low numbers of physicians and 
nurses may reflect an understaffed workforce, or different approaches to skill-mix across health and 
care workers. It should be noted that, while the UK has comparatively lower numbers of clinical staff 
such as nurses and physicians, the total health and care workforce is just above the average of EU15 





How has health and care spending changed over time? 
Public spending on health 
Since the NHS was founded, spending has increased by more than inflation and GDP, rising by an 
average of 3·7% a year in real terms.1 There are three major factors that determine the path of 
health spending over the long term: demographic factors, income effects and other cost pressures.54 
Demographic factors include the age structure of the population, health status at given ages, and 
death-related costs. Income effects reflect that people generally demand more healthcare as their 
income rises. Other cost pressures include the impact of technological advancements and the 
increasing relative cost of healthcare. Over time these factors have led health spending in the UK to 
increase at a faster rate than national income. This is consistent with the pattern seen across OECD 
countries.55 
For almost every year throughout its existence, NHS spending has increased in real terms 
(Supplementary Material Figure 4).1 On only three occasions have there been notable spending 
reductions, twice in the early 1950s and in 1977-78 when the IMF was called upon to support the UK 
economy. However, year-on-year spending growth has been highly volatile with periods of relative 
plenty followed by periods of relative austerity. Between 1948 and 1978 spending increased on 
average by 3·5% a year. During the Conservative Governments of 1979 to 1997, spending growth 
was slightly lower at 3·3% a year. Spending growth increased substantially under the Labour 
Governments between 1997 and 2009, averaging 6% a year.56 Between 2010 and 2018, health 
spending has grown at a markedly lower rate of just 1·2% a year.56  Figure 2 shows per capita and 
age-adjusted per capita health spending. The UK population has been increasing in size, so per capita 
spending has been increasing at a slower rate than NHS expenditure. Moreover, the composition of 
the population has been changing, and becoming older. This means that growth in age-adjusted 
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spending is lower than growth in per capita spending, because older people tend to make greater 
use of healthcare. However, it is important not to overemphasise the contribution of population 
ageing, as individuals generally still see most health expenditure in their last year of life even as the 
population ages. It has been estimated that, independent of population ageing, cost growth and 
technological advancements will be the main drivers of future growth in health spending.57  
Figure 2: Index of real UK health spending (2009-10 = 100) 
 
Source: Authors calculations using data from UK Government Public Expenditure Statistics Analyses, 
2 OBR,58 ONS59 
 
Public spending on social care 
The health and care sectors are linked, and many ill people require support from both. If health and 
care services are complementary, reduced spending on social care may put greater pressure on the 
health sector, and vice versa. Figure 3 shows per capita and age-adjusted per capita adult social care 
spending. While spending on adult social care has reduced in real-terms over the last decade, the 
reduction is significantly larger when adjusted for per capita and age-adjusted per capita spending. 
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Figure 3: Index of real UK adult social care spending (2009-10 = 100) 
 
Source: Authors calculations using data from UK Government Public Expenditure Statistics Analyses, 
2 OBR,58 ONS59 
 
How does health and care spending vary across the UK? 
Public spending on health across the UK 
The funding system in each of the four countries of the UK remains tax-based and free at the point 
of use, with divergence in terms of the use of prescription charges (see role of private spending 
below). Publicly funded health spending per head of population varies across the four UK countries 
(Supplementary Material Table 1). Total funding allocations to each UK country for government 
spending are based on a combination of historical spending and the Barnett formula which 
proportionally adjusts any uplift in government spending in England according to population size to 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.60 Each UK nation then decides how to allocate their resources 
during annual spending reviews. Within England, around two-thirds of the NHS budget is allocated 
via weighted capitation payments to local commissioning bodies taking account of population 
14 
 
factors such as age, gender and deprivation.46 Outturn spending per person is highest in Scotland 
and lowest in England (Supplementary Material Table 1).Although there are regions in England such 
as the North East and London with higher spending per person than Scotland. Differences across the 
UK in spending per person have narrowed, ranging from £1,598-£2,471 in 2010-11, to £1,915-£2,665 
in 2017-18 (Supplementary Material Table 1). This trend warrants further investigation, as it is not 
clear if demographic changes in relative need between regions are responsible, or if other 
contributory factors exist.    
Once allocated to local commissioning bodies in England, an internal market exists whereby both 
NHS and independent sector hospitals are eligible to provide treatment for NHS patients. In 2017-18, 
independent sector hospitals provided over 600,000 publicly funded elective procedures, 6% of all 
NHS elective activity, growing from less than 2000 elective procedures in 2003-4.61 For some 
procedures such as hip replacements, independent sector hospitals now provide 30% of all NHS-
funded procedures.61 Analysis indicates that such reforms, despite less-complex patients being 
treated in the independent care sector, may have improved access and outcomes.62,63 However, 
concerns have been raised regarding a relative lack of transparency in independent sector 
hospitals,64 and the potential impact on the sustainability of NHS services.65 During the pandemic, 
independent sector hospitals have been used to allow the continuation of NHS cancer treatment and 
elective procedures in facilities less exposed to COVID-19.66  
Public spending on social care across the UK 
The constituent countries of the UK are responsible for social care within their jurisdictions. This has 
led to variation in eligibility criteria, and differences in patterns of both funding and delivery. For 
example, in Scotland, personal and nursing care are free, whereas in England all social care is means-
tested (Supplementary Material Table 2). The latter can lead to substantial costs incurred by older 
people needing social care support. The Dilnot Commission (2011) on social care in England found 
that one in ten people, at age 65, would face future lifetime care costs of £100,000.67  
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Social care spending per adult is 31% lower in England than in Scotland, where there is a system of 
free personal care for older people (Supplementary Material Table 3). While differences between 
the four UK nations may reflect differences in eligibility criteria and needs, they also reflect larger 
cuts to social care in England since 2011 (Supplementary Material Table 3). This system has led to 
unequal funding of social care services across the UK. The IFS estimated that between 2009-10 to 
2017-18, councils amongst the most deprived areas made cuts to adult social of care of 17% per 
person as compared to cuts of 3% per person in councils among the least deprived areas.68 These 
differences in social care eligibility and funding across the UK do not appear to have influenced 
preparedness against COVID-19, as all constituent countries experienced significantly increased 
excess mortality in care homes during the pandemic.69–71 
 
What is the role of private spending on health in the UK?   
There is no developed country where private spending is the predominant financing mechanism for 
healthcare services (Figure 1). Even in countries such as the US, which has a more extensively 
privatised financing model, there is still a significant public system to provide coverage for low-
income, elderly and veteran populations. Indeed, despite significant private financing, public 
spending in the US still accounts for a higher percentage of GDP than in the UK (Figure 1). Notably 
also, countries with more privatised models have higher inequalities in access to healthcare 
services,72 a lower redistributive effect between income groups,47 and a higher incidence of 
catastrophic health expenditure.73 
In the UK, private spending on health is just over a fifth of all spending.56 However, the majority of 
the private spending on health is concentrated among individuals in the highest income quintile,74 
with those in the lowest income quintile typically exempt from out-of-pocket payments to access 
NHS services.75,76 Generally, compared to other high-income countries, a major strength of the NHS 
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is financial protection, evidenced by a comparatively low incidence of catastrophic health 
expenditure, which is defined as out-of-pocket payments for healthcare services exceeding a certain 
proportion of household income (Supplementary Material Figure 5). Factors which influence the 
level of financial protection in any country include gaps in coverage, the frequency and size of out-
of-pocket payments, and whether coverage policy is designed in a manner which minimizes out-of-
pocket payments for poor people and regular users of healthcare services.77 
Household health expenditure accounts for just under 70% of private spending in the UK and 
includes both direct purchases of medical goods and services by households, and consumption of 
treatment funded through VHI.78 Overall, payments for pharmaceuticals (co-payments and over-the-
counter) make up around a third (34%) of household health expenditure, followed by therapeutic 
appliances and equipment (20%), hospital services (18%), dental services (12%) and outpatient 
medical services (10%).78 Prescription charges apply only in England (although approximately 90% of 
prescriptions are exempt from charges), having been abolished in Wales (2007), Northern Ireland 
(2010) and Scotland (2011).79 Income inequality in unmet need is greater for dental care than 
medical care, with those in the poorest quintile consistently more likely to report unmet need for 
dental care due to cost, distance or waiting times.80 
In addition to out-of-pocket expenditure, there is VHI for both dental and general health plans. In 
2016, 10·5% of the UK population had some form of VHI, 8% through employer paid schemes, and 
2·5% through individually paid schemes.81 The numbers insured fell slightly following the recession in 
2008 but have now stabilised, although there has been a gradual decrease in the number of 
individually paid subscribers.81 The share of households with VHI varies significantly by income 
quintile, with over 20% of those in the richest quintile and less than 5% of those in the poorest 
quintile having VHI.80 There is also significant variation regionally, with nearly half of the share of UK 
spending on VHI concentrated in London and the South East (Supplementary Material Table 4). 
What level of spending is needed in the future for a sustainable health and care service? 
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Projections of health spending 
Projections of health spending are essential to understand the level of spending needed in the future 
for a sustainable health and care service. These need to take account of the goals of the health 
system, such as maintaining quality and access to a range of services, in line with public 
expectations. A number of bodies such as the OBR and the OECD produce top-down projections of 
health spending for the UK and other countries (Table 1). This involves focusing on the three main 
drivers of health spending categorised as: demographic factors; income effects; and other cost 
pressures.82 The IFS and Health Foundation (HF), and the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
have produced bottom-up projections of health, which are populated with component-based data, 
such as drug costs, provider activity and salaries (Table 1). These projections were all made prior to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, and thus do not factor the consequences of the pandemic or additional 
funding required for preparedness to withstand further acute shocks and major threats to health. 
Arguably the bottom-up projections better capture factors relevant to the UK, and consequently 
provide more robust forecasts. This approach does, however, require significantly more country-
specific data than the top down approach, making it less feasible if projecting expenditure for many 
different countries. However, synergies can be identified between the top-down and bottom-up 
approaches. Both approaches take account of long-term projections of GDP growth, produced by 
organisations such as the OBR,83 and OECD.84 








Projected expenditure  
% GDP 
Top-down Projections 




OECD (constant cost-pressure) 6·5% (2010) n/c 













 (1·6% increase)  




 (2·6% increase) 




Source: Authors own analysis using data from OBR,58 OECD, 55 IPPR,85 and HF/IFS1. n/c: not calculated 
 
Alongside demographic and income effects, top-down projections such as those from the OECD and 
OBR are impacted upon particularly by alternative cost-pressure scenarios, which take account of 
assumptions related to input prices (i.e. labour, goods and services and fixed capital), technological 
advances and changes in policy. The OBR and OECD projections assume that healthcare sector 
productivity is lower relative to the rest of the economy. This is partially due to the Baumol effect, a 
theory which suggests that in labour-intensive industries, such as the healthcare sector, wages must 
keep pace with those in sectors with higher productivity potential. The significance of the Baumol 
effect is debated,87 although both the OECD and the OBR assume there is a Baumol effect for 
healthcare, with pay increasing faster than productivity growth. The Baumol effect is often cited as 
contributing to rising health spending although Baumol himself reflected that such increased 
spending on health is neither necessarily unsustainable nor problematic as long as that spending is 
seen to be valued by society.88 The relationship between technological advances and health 
spending is also complex and often conflicting.89 In different cases, technology can increase costs, be 
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cost-neutral or even cost-saving. However, even if a technology is cost-saving overall health 
expenditure may increase as the new technology allows expansion of treatment, increasing 
treatment volume and therefore increases overall expenditure. Therefore, there is considerable 
uncertainty regarding to what degree technology will increase costs in the future. 
The effect of cost pressures is challenging to forecast and, not surprisingly, results in large variability 
in projections.54 The OECD produces a cost-containment scenario which assumes that changes in 
policy act more strongly than in the past to rein in some of the expenditure growth, and an 
alternative scenario (the cost-pressure scenario) which assumes that cost pressures continue at 1·7% 
a year, the average historical growth across all countries in the OECD. The cost-containment scenario 
projects spending for the UK to increase by 1·4% of GDP, whilst the cost-pressure scenario projects 
an increase of 1·9% of GDP by 2030. The OBR’s projection draws upon a 2015-16 NHS England 
estimate of non-demographic cost pressures of 2.7% and 1.2% per year for primary and secondary 
care respectively.58 They assume these pressures will decline over time to 1% per year from 2036-37 
onwards. The rationale for this assumption is that this decline might be expected as health spending 
takes up an even larger share of national income. This approach projects 2.6% of GDP increase in 
health spending by 2037-38.  
The HF/IFS bottom-up projections use two alternative scenarios. The status quo scenario takes 
account of core demand and cost pressures but does not provide sufficient funding to return waiting 
times to their target levels, support improvements to quality and outcomes or modernise the 
physical infrastructure of the health service. This scenario projects an annual real growth rate of 
3·3% for the UK, and public spending of 8·9% of GDP by 2033-34. The HF/IFS alternative scenario 
returns the NHS to prior levels of care quality and allows improvement in key priority areas of unmet 
need, including A&E performance, waiting times for elective care and outpatient appointments, 
mental health, capital spending and public health. This scenario projects an annual average real 
growth rate of 4% and public spending of 9·9% of GDP by 2033-34.1 Further areas of unmet need are 
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identified in other accompanying LSE-Lancet Commission background papers such as the health and 
care workforce,53 and health information technology.90 The 4% growth rate is also broadly consistent 
with the other bottom-up projections from the Institute for Public Policy Research which also uses a 
bottom-up methodology and projects a real annual growth rate of around a 3·8%.85  
When analysing these approaches together, some conclusions can be made. Top-down projections 
demonstrate that assumptions related to input prices, technological advances and changes in policy 
significantly impact future estimates of health spending. From bottom-up projections, there is broad 
consensus that health spending needs to increase by 3·3% to 4% in real-terms, per year. However, if 
we are to seek improvements in the quality of NHS care, rather than oversee its degradation, 
increases need to average at least 4% in real-terms, per year. Further evidence to support such 
increases in health spending is contained in our background paper on the health and care 
workforce,53 which estimates that increases in health spending of 4% in real-terms, per year, is 
necessary to sustain growth in the workforce at 2.3% per year. However, it is important to note 
these top-down projections were undertaken prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, and assume that GDP 
growth will increase, on average, by 1.9% per year until 2033-34.1 Therefore, these projections give 
an indication of the level of spending required for a long-term funding settlement for the NHS, 
assuming GDP growth in the long term returns to pre-pandemic projections. In the short-term, 
further increases in public spending will continue to be needed for the NHS to respond to the 
pandemic, and address the growing unmet need for healthcare services caused by postponing or 
cancelling elective procedures and diagnostic tests. We also recommend an independent review to 
examine what additional funds are required to improve the preparedness and resilience of the 
health and care system to withstand further acute shocks and major threats to health. 
Projections of Social Care Spending 
With current eligibility criteria maintained, HF/IFS adapted projections from the Personal Social 
Services Research Unit (PSSRU; now Care Policy and Evaluation Centre, LSE) to estimate that public 
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funding for social care needs to increase by 3·9% per year until at least 2033 to meet demand 
(Figure 4). These projections estimate future demand for adult social care by including projections of 
population size, age, gender, and prevalence of disability, and future expenditure by projecting the 
rising cost of providing social care services. Included in the expenditure projections is the 
assumption that health and social care costs rise in real terms in line with productivity, with an uplift 
to take account of the planned rises in the national living wage. 91  
Figure 4: UK Social Care Spending Projections 
 
Source: HF/IFS1 and PSSRU1,91 
It is also important to note that reform of the social care model is long overdue. In England and 
Northern Ireland, current eligibility criteria and thresholds have remained unchanged since 2010-11. 
This has contributed to over 400,000 fewer people accessing publicly funded social care in England in 
2016−17 than in 2009−10 despite growing needs associated with, for example, population ageing.92 
Future public social care spending will be dependent upon whether and how social care funding is 
reformed. Different options have been explored to reach a long-term funding settlement for social 
care. The Dilnot commission on ‘Fairer Care Funding’ suggested a lifetime cap of individual 
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contributions of £35,000, and a means-tested threshold of £100,000.67 The government responded 
by initially suggesting introduction of a lifetime cap for individual contributions of £75,000, although 
this has been postponed indefinitely.93 The 2017 Conservative Manifesto proposed implementing a 
means-tested threshold of £100,000 as suggested by the Dilnot Commission.94 The 2019 
Conservative Manifesto recommitted to the concept of improved financial protection,95 but no 
reform has taken place to date. No matter what reform is introduced for social care, a guiding 
principle should be to increase financial protection, so a substantial increase in public funding is 
likely to be required. For example, it has been estimated that to implement a £100,000 means-
tested threshold and £75,000 life cap on individual contributions in England alone, would cost an 
additional £3·2 billion (2018-19 prices).96   
Productivity and health spending 
Any claims made for increased spending on health or social care will need to come with the 
assurance that these funds will be put to good use. This is most commonly established by measuring 
productivity, which compares the amount of output produced against the inputs used by any 
particular sector of the economy. In the healthcare sector, outputs are measured by taking account 
of factors such as: the number of hospital patients treated as elective cases; day cases or emergency 
admission; and also the number of outpatient contacts in primary care, mental health and 
community trusts.97 These outputs are cost-weighted and adjusted according to quality using 
indicators such as: patient reported outcome measures; waiting times; survival in hospital settings; 
and the quality and outcomes framework (QOF) in primary care.97 Health outcomes such as life 
expectancy are not considered as outputs as these are not wholly attributable to the healthcare 
sector, also being impacted upon by sectors outside of health. Healthcare inputs include the number 
of doctors, nurses and support staff providing care, the equipment and clinical supplies used, and 
the hospitals and other premises where care is provided.97 If growth in output exceeds growth in 
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input, healthcare productivity has increased. However, note productivity may increase if inputs have 
been cut. 
The rate of productivity growth in the healthcare sector since the early 2000s compares favourably 
with that achieved by other public sectors and the economy as a whole.98  However, the NHS, like 
the economy as whole, faces challenges in continuing to make productivity gains.99 There are 
concerns that positive past productivity growth will not persist into the future. Productivity gains 
may have been achieved by restricting growth in staffing levels, implying that existing staff have 
been working harder at a time when wage growth up to 2018/19 was limited to 1% per annum. Such 
a position is not sustainable. To retain staff and keep them motivated, especially in a situation of 
reduced immigration, wages will have to increase in line with economy-wide average earnings. For 
social care, reductions in productivity may be due to high turnover of low paid staff employed in a 
sector characterised by weak employment conditions, which itself reflects an increasing mismatch 
between funding and current demand. Low wages and reduced bed availability have impacted 
morale and left providers not capable of improving productivity.   
Staff also need the right equipment and technology to do their jobs. It has long been recognised that 
many of the more productive companies are those that have invested more heavily in capital and 
technology,100 a process termed ´capital deepening´.101 But in recent years the NHS has experienced 
the reverse. Capital funds have been raided to fund hospital deficits, leading to a backlog in 
maintenance and poor investment in technology.102 Capital Investment per NHS worker has fallen in 
real terms by 17% between 2010-11 and 2017-18.103 This will need to be rectified in order to secure 
future productivity growth. Looking forward, working existing inputs harder will not be enough. It 





This paper has covered a series of policy questions and a number of conclusions can be drawn. The 
health and care sectors undeniably play a valuable role in improving population health and societal 
wellbeing, reducing health and income inequalities, and supporting economic growth. The UK has 
witnessed a large increase in health spending since the NHS was established, but growth in spending 
has slowed significantly in recent years. The UK spends around the average of the EU15, but still less 
than many other comparable high-income nations. Funding for social care, in real terms, has 
decreased in recent years, which has implications for the NHS, as the two sectors are inextricably 
linked. Within the UK, there is variation in health and care spending, with Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland all spending more per capita than England. The role of private spending also varies 
significantly, concentrated in high-income groups, particularly in London and the South East. We 
conclude that, for a sustainable health and care service, public spending on the NHS and social care 
will need to increase, on average, by at least 4% per year in real terms. An independent review is 
needed to estimate the additional funds required to improve the preparedness and resilience of the 
health and care system to withstand further acute shocks and major threats to health. The pandemic 
will be responsible for a significant recession that creates challenges to sustaining increases in health 
and care spending. It must be remembered that the NHS was established, shortly after World War II, 
during one of the most economically challenging times the UK has endured. The foundations for 
today’s social care system were also laid at that time. As then, the NHS and social care will be 
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